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Robert E. Looney 
INTRODUCTION 
In almost every country, industry is the glamour sector of economic 
development. People look to industrial development to provide much 
needed employment, to generate higher individual and national income, 
to relieve balance of payments constraints through import substitution, 
to open up markets for primary products such as those from the mining 
and fishing sectors, to give the country greater economic independence, 
to generate new tax revenues, and to furnish an important source of 
national pride. 1 By and large, these hoped for benefits of industrial-
ization are realistic - provided a country makes sensible choices. 
Until recently, investment in Saudi Arabia has concentrated on 
infrastructure, light manufacturing and construction materials. Most 
of the major products in transportation, communications, health, 
education, electricity, and water that were initiated in the 1970s are 
completed or nearing completion. Since the mid-1970s, attention has 
centred on industrial development, primarily in the downstream activities 
of the petroleum sector and on import substitution. 
In fact, one of the most intriguing question marks concerning the 
kingdom's development strategy centres precisely around the govern-
ment's selection of industries. A steel plant, fertilizer plants, domestic 
and export-oriented refineries, and a series of major petrochemical 
complexes form the basis of the government's attempt to diversify the 
economy. What is the rationalization for this strategy and is all this 
too ambitious for a country with virtually no previous industrial 
experience?2 
As Yannis Stournaras3 has recently noted, the whole rationality of 
this policy has been seriously questioned. The main purpose of this paper 
is to examine in some detail the basic arguments for and against the 
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industrial strategy adopted by Saudi Arabia. The aim is to provide some 
general explanations rather than a detailed cost-benefit analysis of 
specific projects. 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
The existence of under-exploited gas reserves in the kingdom has 
been one of the strongest arguments for developing gas-based heavy 
industries. Gas - especially the dry gases, methane and ethane - is 
an expensive product to transport, thus making it sensible to look for 
more productive uses for its exploitation. 
International trade theory is capable of rationalizing a gas-based 
industrialization strategy. For example, according to the Heckscher-
Ohlin theory of international trade, a country tends to have lower 
comparative costs in the commodity that uses the largest amount of the 
relatively cheapest factor in its economy. These considerations provide 
the fundamental rationale for specialization. 4 In general terms, the 
theory indicates that Saudi Arabia should establish and promote 
industries primarily based on natural gas and/ or oil. These are the 
industries, everything else aside, that are most likely to be efficient and 
successful. Fortunately for the Saudis, these industries are not only 
energy intensive but also capital intensive. Thus, they tend to utilize 
its abundant financial surplus as well as gas and oil. 
Once oil has been produced at an optimal rate, there is an excellent 
theoretical argument for developing gas intensive industries around it. 5 
These can either be chemical industries, which use the gas as a feedstock 
for conversion into higher value and more easily transportable chemical 
products, or they can be energy intensive industries such as steel or 
aluminium production, where the gas can be used as a reasonably cheap 
source of energy. 
Few observers would quibble with these general observations. The 
planners' task in identifying precisely those industries best suited for 
the kingdom has not been as easy as it might appear at first sight, 
however. 
Because the country had virtually no heavy industry or industrial 
experience to speak of in the early 1970s, the Heckscher-Ohlin predicted 
pattern of trade had not been established and the price system had not 
developed to the point where it was capable of giving the planners the 
correct signals as to the best areas of investment. In addition, a number 
of less obvious considerations surrounding the introduction of heavy 
industry into the country have made it extremely difficult to design 
procedures capable of identifying the most effective methods of 
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allocating the country's resources. Although financial capital may not 
be a constraint, especially in the short term, the kingdom has to face 
other constraints to industrial development. Physical bottlenecks, 
manpower shortages and inflation have proved to be real impediments 
to the absorptive capacity of the economy. In particular, the impact 
of these negative factors has often been most severe in the very develop-
mental activities intrinsic to a successful diversification policy. 
GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY 
A number of potentially profitable projects have been identified by the 
government for its investment programme. These are industries which 
conform to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade by using relatively 
large amounts of the kingdom's relatively abundant factors of produc-
tion, oil, natural gas and capital. These industries appear attractive 
because not only do they mesh into the present structure of the economy, 
but also should logically fit the next phase of development by providing 
competitive exports with which to pay for future imports. 
Because the capital cost of these industries is immense, the private 
sector is unable to undertake investment in them at this time. Instead, 
the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) was founded by the 
government to initiate development of the kingdom's heavy industries. 
The Saudi Basic Industries Corporation was set up in 1976 with a 
capital of SR 10 billion to undertake investments in operation and 
marketing of products in the basic industries, using local hydrocarbon 
and mineral resources and other complementary and supporting 
industries. 6 SABIC has so far set up and developed 14 industrial 
companies in Jubail, Yanbu, Heddah and Dammam and work is pro-
gressing on the establishment of two new companies. By the first quarter 
of 1986, all of these companies were in operation except for one of the 
new companies, which is expected to begin production in 19887 (Table 
l). With these facilities, Saudi Arabia is capable of producing between 
four and five per cent of the world's primary petrochemical output. 8 
The features of these industrial operations and planned industrial 
development have emerged sufficiently to allow us to characterize the 
future industrial structure and industrial employment of Saudi Arabia. 
In August 1985, the government announced that more than SR16,000 
($4,384 million) is to be spent on expansion of SABIC during the current 
development plan ( 1985-90). According to SABI C, more than half the 
new investment will be channelled into building more downstream petro-
chemical plants and just over 20 per cent of the total will be devoted 
to further plastics and rubber industries. 9 
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As noted, most of these plants are sited at Jubail and Yanbu, located 
respectively on the East and West coasts of Saudi Arabia. Both are new 
industrial cities that represent enormous undertakings. Jubail is expected 
to grow to a city of 280,000 by the year 2010, and Yanbu will have a 
population of 100,000-200,000 persons. All infrastructure had to be 
planned and provided. Much of the new industrial investment in 
petrochemicals will be loeated in these two cities. w 
The private sector is strongly encouraged to participate in the 
country's industrialization, through utilizing the output of the SABIC 
industries, this being one of the major objectives behind the kingdom's 
industrial development strategy. Among the incentives provided to the 
private sector are: 11 
1. Exemption from import taxes on imported machinery, spare 
parts and raw materials; 
2. Protective tariffs or quotas against competing imports; 
3. Financial assistance on very easy terms (primarily through SIDF 
financing); 
4. Long-term leasing of industrial sites at nominal rents ($0.03/ 
sq. m. for building lands); 
5. Electricity at heavily subsidized rates ($0.02 per KWH, although 
it appears likely that the cost will have to be increased in line 
with 'rationalization' policies; 
6. Preferential treatment for locally manufactured goods in 
government procurements; 
7. Assistance in the identification of viable projects through cheap 
feedstock and guaranteed supplies of crude for 15 -20 years 
(500 bid for every $1 billion in investment, although the govern-
ment is reported to be reneging on some agreements, and in 
some cases, the 'cheap' price was set when oil prices were at 
a peak, making the terms far less tempting in today's market). 
In sum, the government has tried vigorously over the last decade to 
expand the industrial base of the country. This has been undertaken 
through encouraging and subsidizing private sector industrial projects 
and by initiating the development of large-scale industrial projects in 
the public sector. The government's motives for promoting industrial 
expansion include: 12 
1. The desire to exploit Saudi Arabia's natural resources in as 
efficient (and profitable) a way as possible. Thus, large public 
sector projects and joint ventures draw on crude petroleum and 
natural gas (much of which used to be flared) as raw materials. 
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An added advantage of this form of industrial development 
is that it increases the vertical integration of the newly Saudized 
domestic oil industry, giving it more influence in world markets. 
2. The desire to diversify the economy. It is recognized that petro-
chemical and other energy-related projects contribute little in 
this respect, insofar as their performance is strongly related to 
demand conditions in the international energy markets. Light 
industries which are the domain of the private sector are more 
useful in increasing the level of economic diversification, 
although the scope for their expansion is limited. 
3. The desire to ensure a greater degree of regional balance by 
positioning industries in a number of different locales, so as 
to provide employment for underemployed labour, distribute 
the kingdom's wealth more widely, and consolidate the king-
dom's physical structure. 
4. The desire to enhance the role of the private sector, especially 
as the public sector continues to expand. Light industries are 
regarded as an eminently suitable avenue for the utilization 
of private capital. 
5. The desire to offer local banks the opportunity to assume a 
greater degree of oversight risk, to ensure the integration of 
the financial sector into the mainstream of domestic economic 
activity. 
Despite the massive amounts of investment in Saudi Arabian industry 
- $10 billion in refinery projects and another $10 billion in plants using 
ethane and methane as feedstock to produce products such as ethylene, 
polyethylene, ethylene glycol and methanoi - the contribution of the 
industrial sector to GDP, although growing, has been fairly limited. 
The contribution of manufacturing to GDP was 5.0 per cent in 1980, 
but by 1985 this had increased to 8.1 per cent. This pattern is f ~rly typical 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Table 2). 
Saudi Arabia's development plans for the Fourth Plan period 
( 1985 -90) place great emphasis on continued industrialization, human 
resources development and increased use of local products and ser-
vices.13 Associated with these goals is the development of a more 
appropriate financial system that would facilitate channelling private 
capital to productive projects. Emphasis is moving from infrastructure 
building to production. There are priority shifts as well within the 
infrastructure from construction and transportation to operations 
and maintenance and from physical to social and educational infra-
structure. These are being paralleled by directional changes in the 
• EHME-M 
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TABLE 2 
CONTRIBUTION OF MANUFACTURING SECTORS TO GDP IN THE 
GCC COUNTRIES, 1980-1985 
1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Saudi Arabia 5.0 4.3 5.8· 7.5 8.1 
Kuwait 5.9 6.6 6.4 6.3 6.6 
UAE 3.8 8.2 8.7 8.7 n.a. 
Oman 0.7 1.4 2.3 2.8 n.a. 
Bahrain 11.5 11.3 11.5 11.8 n.a. 
Qatar 3.3 5.0 6.0 6.0 n.a. 
Sources: Various National and Regional Sources Including: Unified Arab Economic Report, 
1985, edited by The Arab Monetary Fund 
area of production from construction materials to basic industries and 
manufacturing. 14 
In sum, the Saudi government hopes that the development of heavy 
industry in the petrochemical sector will spawn a wide range of manu-
facturing activities. There are two major reasons why the kingdom can 
rationalize reversing the more typical experience of developing light 
manufacturing first and heavy industry second. With 40 per cent of world 
crude oil reserves, Saudi Arabia has the resource endowment to support 
an efficient petrochemical sector, and it is natural that petrochemical 
facilities be established to process this crude. Initially, Saudi Arabia 
will export most of its primary petrochemical output, but over time 
chemical and plastics enterprises can be established locally to process 
increasing proportions of primary petrochemical output. Second, with 
a relatively small labour force and relatively large amounts of capital 
(government foreign exchange assets exceeded $150 million in 1983), 
capital intensive operations are consistent with relative factor endow-
ments in Saudi Arabia. 1s 
THE CASE FOR PETROCHEMICALS 
In addition to the availability of gas, several additional characteristics 
associated with petrochemicals have made investment in this industry 
especially attractive to the Saudi government. 16 
Capital Intensity 
This industry enjoys one of the highest capital/Jabour ratios in the world. 
In fact, investment per new job created is estimated at $20,000 to 
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$100,000. Also, larger amounts of investment are required as the stage 
of production advances from basic products to intermediaries to finished 
products and finally to the consumer stage. In fact, the investment 
required for the transformation of finished products into consumer or 
industrial products (third manufacturing phase) is two or three times 
higher than that necessary for the production of intermediate products 
(second manufacturing phase) and five times higher than that necessary 
for the production of basic products (first manufacturing phase). 
Economies of Sale 
Investments do not vary in proportion to the capacity, but rather 
according to a power factor generally lying between 0.6 and 0.85. 
This is the reason why it is advantageous to build large capacity units 
which cost proportionately less than small or medium capacity units. 
Manpower as well as general and plant overhead also appear to have 
proportionately lower expenditures with larger plant size. 
Given Saudi Arabia's abundant endowments of both the raw 
materials and capital needed to finance large-scale investments, 
petrochemicals seem to be an ideal sector around which the country could 
build its industrialization prngtarnme. 
SOME POLICY ISSUES 
There are at least two main issues17 related to industrialization in Saudi 
Arabia. One is that the existing and anticipated expansion of industrial 
activity implies considerable strain on the government and private enter-
prise. It also means accentuating the disadvantages in factor proportions 
that are critically vital for self-sustained industrial growth, namely, skills 
and markets. 
The second important issue relates to the diseconornies of competition. 
There is little doubt that the lack of coordination in the Gulf, until the 
recent past, over industrial projects had led to wasteful duplication and 
lowered the returns on investments. In these cases, the problems are 
the same: short production runs, high fixed costs in relation to total 
costs and diseconomies of scale. 18 
More specifically, the problems and constraints facing the kingdom's 
industrial development schemes can be detailed as follows: 
1. The kingdom's most ambitious industrial objective, to become 
an international force in the production and marketing of 
petrochemicals, has involved it in disputes with its trade 
partners in Western Europe and the United States. The market 
• 
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for petrochemicals is currently depressed and the current (1987) 
potential for producing $3 billion (or more) worth of petro-
chemicals requires that the kingdom continue to fight for a 
major share of the international market. The EEC and the 
United States are likely to intensify the degree of protectionism 
currently in effect to protect their petrochemical industries, 
citing as pretext the heavy subsidization off eedstock in Saudi 
Arabia (where the government charges producers $0.50 per 
million BTU, compared with $4.50-5.00 in Western Europe 
and $3.30-3.50 in the United States). 19 
2. Regardless of how emphatic Saudi Arabia planners are about 
promoting private sector participation, the Saudi economy is 
largely driven by government expenditure, 20 the level of which 
is to some extent (not totally) dependent on the level of oil 
revenues, which fluctuate as oil prices vary and as world markets 
continue to be depressed. This results in complications for the 
industrial sector inasmuch as: 
(a) The heavy petrochemical industrial projects require con-
siderable capital allocations, and their scale cannot be easily 
adjusted up or down. As fiscal pressures intensified with 
the recent oil revenue declines and planners became aware 
that they could not count on nearly infinite supplies of 
capital, they became more reluctant to invest in 'mega-
projects', cancelling some which had already been planned 
and slowing down payments to others. This tends to shake 
the confidence of foreign partners and has complicated 
marketing plans. 
(b) Private sector (mostly light) industries are sensitive to the 
level of government spending, since government-funded or 
supported projects provide the basis for demand for many 
light industrial projects. By the end of 1984, for instance, 
over ten private sector factories had closed and some 40 
enterprises were reporting serious problems in meeting 
financial obligations or launching marketing campaigns. 21 
One major manufacturer estimates that his total sales de-
clined by over 50 per cent during 1984 and 1985. One of his 
responses has been to cut employment by over one-third. 22 
(c) Government subsidized loans by the Saudi Industrial 
Development Fund (SIDF) have decreased significantly. 
SIDF was a major source of industrial investment funds 
during the 1970s and early 1980s. Private investors have 
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been more reluctant to commit funds as domestic spending 
has slowed. Domestic investors are accustomed to the high 
rates of return on investment realized during the period of 
rapid growth from 1974 to 1982. Foreign investors too made 
highly profitable investments during this period. Some 
foreign investments were made to ensure supplies of crude 
and this incentive no longer applies. As a result, some 
investments in secondary and light industries have been post-
poned or cancelled. These are the industries associated with 
lower capital/labour ratios. 23 
3. As in nearly all sectors of the economy, the manpower shortage 
is a serious constraint. Not only does the scarcity of skilled and 
unskilled workers translate into higher labour costs, but the 
adoption and implementation of proper management and 
marketing techniques in the industrial sector is sometimes 
hampered by the lack of adequate expertise. University edu-
cation at home and abroad is slowly filling the upper echelons of 
management with well-trained Saudis, but the prospects for 
filling middle management positions with qualified Saudis are 
problematic. 
4. Despite modest success in building industrial estates outside the 
major industrial centres of Jeddah, Riyadh, Damman, Yanbu 
and Jubail (with partially completed industrial centres in Qassim 
province northwest of Riyadh, at Hassa in the Eastern Province 
and at Mecca), the prospects for additional industrial expansion 
in the provinces are limited. The need for budgetary austerity 
necessitates the rethinking of spending priorities, a process likely 
to penalize projected investment in localities distant from major 
market outlets and requiring substantial infrastructural invest-
ment. While additional estates are planned at Asir, Medina, 
Hail and Tabuk, earlier projections of provincial industrial 
growth are being scaled down in size and geographic scope. 
5. The domestic market is too small to absorb enough production 
to make economies of scale a factor in most cases. The prospects 
for foreign markets for Saudi products are limited, and the 
possibility of GCC integration expanding the scope for Saudi 
industrial output is circumscribed by the lack of coordination 
and duplication in industrial effort among GCC members. In 
this regard, Saudi Arabia is favoured. Crude (a primary factor 
of industrial production) is produced more cheaply and on a 
larger scale in Saudi Arabia than elsewhere. At the same time, 
. 
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Saudi Arabia has a far larger population than other GCC 
countries. Gains from integration (in terms of generating 
demand for locally produced goods) may accrue to other GCC 
countries - initially at least. 
Concentrated efforts at regional cooperation and coordination 
appear absolutely essential for Saudi Arabia, given the fact that the 
kingdom's neighbours have similar resources and industrial aptitudes. 
Unless development is coordinated, it is likely that there will be major 
duplication between states in the energy-based industries. Awareness 
of these problems has led to a good deal of consultation and contact 
in the region, as is illustrated by the following examples: 24 
1. One of the recommendations approved by the Arab Gulf Co-
operation Council called for the establishment of an industrial 
cooperation committee with a view to promoting greater co-
ordination and interaction; 
2. Steps are being taken to constitute institutional apparatus for 
coordination of petrochemicals industry so as to (a) achieve 
product specialization, (b) prevent harmful duplications, and 
(c) evolve a regional strategy; 
3. Institutions, such as the Gulf Organization for Industrial Con-
sulting, have been created to encourage coordination between 
and among the states of the region in their respective plans 
for economic and industrial development. Here again, the intent 
was to avoid unnecessary duplication of projects; 
4. At the project level, Saudi Arabia has acquisitioned 20 per cent 
of equity holding in the ALBA (Aluminium Bahrain), and has 
dropped its plans of having its own aluminium smelter. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
Several general lessons have emerged from Saudi Arabia's initial 
attempts at industrialization. 25 The most important is that there is no 
industrial option open, even including petrochemicals, to the country 
which gives anywhere near the kind of returns provided by successful 
investments in the oil sector. This implies that while the country may 
be choosing to restrict production levels for the benefit of future 
generations, it is still not absolved from the responsibility of ensuring 
that oil is produced as efficiently as possible. That means ensuring that 
existing oil fields are exploited with the best techniques, with growing 
attention to enhanced recovery and to the exploration necessary to 
replace declining production in existing fields . 
• 
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In countries like Saudi Arabia, prudence may dictate the building 
of pipelines designed to give greater commercial flexibility. With oil 
prices still far above oil production costs, the country's planners would 
be extremely unwise not to start by ensuring they are getting the optimal 
returns from the oil sector before turning their attention to diversification 
strategies. 26 
Second, it appears that there is not a very strong case for investing 
in export-oriented refining capacity. The bulk transportation of crude 
oil will always remain cheaper than transporting oil products, so the 
best the kingdom can do is maximize the efficiency of its refineries. 
However, the comparatively greater cost of transporting oil products 
rather than crude is still very small in comparison to the final market 
price of oil. It is, therefore, perhaps at least possible to def end the 
decision to increase refining capacity. 
Third, before utilizing gas in industry, Saudi planners should first 
ensure that they have used it as productively as possible in prolonging 
the life of oil fields (through gas ejection) or in substitution for oil in 
the domestic economy (thus releasing high value crude for export). The 
returns from exporting oil are so much more than exporting gas or its 
derivatives that there is an overwhelming logic in substituting gas for 
oil in such areas as electricity generation, oil refinery powering and 
desalinization. 
Fourth, simple generalizations about the comparative economics of 
petrochemicals are difficult to make since a project which may make 
economic sense in a tight market may be unjustifiable if its products 
are in global oversupply. However, it appears that the creation of gas-
based industries in the kingdom makes sense if the relative cheapness 
of the country's gas can be used to overcome some comparative disad-
vantages which the country currently faces: 
1. Construction costs are high in Saudi Arabia for the current 
generation of plants under construction. Costs may be at least 
a quarter more expensive than in the United States or Western 
Europe. 
2. The country is a long way from the richest world markets (North 
America, Japan and Western Europe). Its export-oriented 
industries will have to be particularly competitive if they are 
to break into these established markets. The alternative strategy 
is to aim for markets in Africa and Asia where the country 
may be closer as a supplier than the established competition 
in the advanced industrial countries. However, there are limits 
to how far the country can concentrate solely on Third World 
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markets, which are by definition relatively poor and unsuitable 
for the more sophisticated chemical products. 27 
Fifth, it must be emphasized that regional cooperation is essential, 
not only as a means for securing access to the wider regional market 
for the growing petrochemical industries, but also as a vehicle for 
coordination and harmonization with the other oil producers' plans 
for the development of petrochemicals and various energy and capital 
intensive industries. This type of cooperation is particularly necessary 
to prevent duplication, waste and harmful competition. 28 
Finally, a number of different factors have combined to form 
a bias against the conversion of oil revenues into productive industrial 
output and employment. It has been much easier to create direct 
government employment than industrial employment. To develop 
public sector jobs it is only necessary to build a room and put a desk 
in it; to develop a job in the modern industrial sector involves importing 
machinery and finding a skilled work force. The easiest activity for 
the government to promote has been construction, and the authorities 
have been notably successful in this area. Most of the jobs in this 
sector, however, have gone to foreigners. 
The underlying reasons accounting for so few Saudis employed 
in modern industries are, in addition to those mentioned above, 
numerous, complex and interwoven. They include: 
l. The great distances between regions and the poor communi-
cations connecting many parts of the kingdom; 
2. Many government loans and grants to small farmers with the 
objective of aiding their mechanization and modernization are 
not spent on farming activity, but instead are considered 
additional income by recipients and spent on consumer goods -
the result is to raise the opportunity cost of leaving the rural 
sector; 29 
3. The high value that rural men in Saudi Arabia place on leisure 
reinforced by the utilization of women in activities not per-
missible in urban areas; 
4. Various government payments for social welfare contribute 
significantly to rural incomes; 
5. Supplemental incomes earned by many in agriculture from 
patronage, traditional obligations and loyalties, and rents 
from family properties and land; 
6. The high financial and social costs of moving into cities; rents 
are high, properties difficult to acquire. 
7. Conditions in towns are relatively poor, meaning that the 
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standard of life in the cities for lower and middle income Saudis 
is lower than in rural areas; 
8. Even at unskilled manual levels at which Saudi nationals are 
unwilling to work, foreign labour which is most cost effective 
is easily available. 
Given the virtually unlimited amount of financial resources, the ex-
istence of large amounts of low or underemployment in Saudi Arabia 
is somewhat surprising. It has been shown, however, that this condition 
is the direct result of a complex mix of economic and social factors. 
One additional factor is the phenomenon of socially induced voluntary 
underemployment because Saudi workers are biased against types of 
work which th~y consider socially inferior. 30 
Labour theory suggests that the unwillingness to accept socially 
undesirable employment can be overcome by payment of a premium 
over the wages in the more desirable occupations. The market 
equilibrium wage would then be established by the simultaneous inter-
action between the strength of demand and the distribution of tastes. 
It appears, however, that in Saudi Arabia the social factors are so strong 
that, given the limited size of internal markets and the inefficiency of 
labour and capital in the modern industrial sector, the wage gap is not 
large enough to draw Saudi workers into the formal sector. The extended 
family, subsidized loans, and the existence of the informal sector 
enabling occasional work to supplement other income allow Saudi 
workers to set a high reservation wage. 31 
There should be a large enough positive compensating wage differen-
tial to overcome the reluctance to accept socially inferior jobs. It appears, 
however, that in Saudi Arabia, because the income incentive is so weak, 
even excessively high wages are not sufficient to entice Saudi workers 
into the industrial work force. 
As a result of this interaction of economic and social factors, 
numerous Saudi workers have not gained appreciably from economic 
development. In most cases, their move from country to city involves 
a horizontal move from one low productivity job to another. 
Underemployment continues to exist because the planners have failed 
to provide the right types of government opportunities given the existing 
cultural environment. Again, in time this problem may be overcome. 
It is hard to predict at this point, however, whether Saudis will eventually 
be more inclined to join the industrial work force. The outcome may 
depend on how successful technology transfer to the kingdom is during 
the next decade or so. 
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TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 
Within the framework of Saudi Arabia's industrial strategy, attention 
is being closely paid to the selection of new technology and the means 
of innovating the existing technology. The concept of technology transfer 
used here is expanded to apply to the transfer of technological know-
how internally between various industries and scientific R & D organ-
izations and also internationally from similar institutions in other 
countries. 
True industrialization is achieved not only through production 
but also through the development of national design and application 
capability so that an increasing number of products can be conceptu-
alized and realized in Saudi Arabia. There are at present many areas 
where such capability has already been developed: progress is being made 
with acquired maturity. 
It may be opportune to point out that the course of the transfer of 
technology has never been a smooth one. Among the major obstacles 
that the Saudis have had to overcome in their attempt to absorb new 
technology are: 
I. Lack of industrial infrastructure and an industrial tradition; 
2. Lack of skilled manpower, particularly on operational levels 
(e.g., skilled workers and technicians), and 
3. The reluctance of many foreign companies to cooperate 
sincerely in the transfer of technology. 
In the past decade, the Saudis have begun to adopt a cohesive effort 
to tackle the issue of technology transfer. The most important measures 
which have been taken are: 32 
I. Introducing advanced technical subjects in vocational schools 
and universities; 
2. Establishing contact with technical and scientific organizations 
of international repute, and 
3. Sending many students and researchers to institutions of higher 
education abroad in the various branches of science and 
technology. 
It is recognized that sustained growth of the technological base is 
almost directly correlated to the quantity and quality of research and 
development work being carried out. Therefore, the Saudi Arabian 
government has been investing heavily in its institutions of higher 
learning, and at the same time establishing the real data base which 
indigenous research requires. 33 
192 
SAUDI ARABIA'S INDUSTRIALIZATION STRATEGY 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is still too early to say with much certainty what success the kingdom 
will have in its industrialization effort. The country is still going through 
an experimental period in which it is finding out exactly what future 
its oil and gas sector has and which kinds of industrial diversification 
make the most sense for its society. One lesson which will probably 
emerge is that it is pointless to push ahead too fast wtih such a diversifi-
cation. 34 It takes time to build up an industrial culture, and there may 
be no point in developing industries which have to be run by more 
expatriates than the indigenous society can tolerate. At the same time, 
we really do not know if the Saudi workers will choose to dedicate 
themselves to mastering manufacturing skills. It may well be that they 
will pref er to continue settling for desk jobs, in which case the kingdom's 
strategy should continue to be to develop a limited range of capital 
intensive hydrocarbon processing industries, firmly leaving the labour 
intensive operations for other countries. 
Based on its factor endowments, the private sector in conjunction 
with government guidance has been wise in selecting techniques of 
production which make maximum use of available energy and/ or capital 
resources. Government investment in petrochemicals, cement, and steel 
are examples of energy and capital intensive industries. In other 
industries catering primarily to the local markets, such as the building 
materials industry, capital intensive techniques of production must be 
chosen to combat acute labour shortages prevalent in most of these 
countries. Unlike labour surplus economies unable to draw extensively 
on existing modern foreign technology because it is labour saving, 
Western technology is particularly suited to the factor endowment of 
the kingdom. The employment of capital intensive and sophisticated 
techniques of production requires, however, skilled and scientifically 
trained manpower. Thus, the upgrading of human resources will become 
a critical factor in expanding the capital absorptive capacity of the 
economy. 
Few other countries would consider or could afford to consider the 
industrial programme taking place in Saudi Arabia. There is a genuine 
concern for the educational, social, and ethical development of the Saudi 
citizen, from a current low base. Much has been accomplished in the 
last ten years, but standards are still not high. Much more will be done 
in the coming decade, but without satisfying employment prospects, 
a contradiction between talents and expectations on the one hand and 
opportunities on the other must inevitably arise. 
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